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    Now the world is in the fifth wave of transnational incorporation and 
purchase since 1993, and it is still in the ascendant in the 21st century, 
expanding from traditional industries to technology industry and finance 
industry. Chinese enterprises are now on the arena and widely focused. 
On the background of economic globalization, the fifth wave of 
transnational incorporation and purchase certainly will have impacts on 
and bring challenges to our country. In order to make a success, top 
management compensation incentive is absolutely necessary, and it is the 
core issue of corporate governance. The America and other western 
countries have spent a long time studying and continually perfecting top 
management compensation incentive mechanism. China is trying to break 
away from the centralization of state power of planned economy. Now 
Chinese capital market is facing the god-given opportunities, such as the 
state-owned assets management system, the financial system, the social 
security system, etc, all have magnitude progresses; the financial 
instruments innovation is quickening; the structure of market and 
investors have both taken big changes. Especially the changes brought by 
the reform of non-tradable shares, the reform of  state-owned assets 
system, the recessions of “Company Law” and “Securities Law”. All 
these require the incentive mechanism, which can incentive and restrict 
the behaviors of top management. Good corporate governance mechanism can 
reduce the cost of proxy and the cost of capital. 
    This paper uses the case analysis method and normal analysis method, 
and analyzes the differences and reasons of the changes in top management 
compensation after Lenovo’s purchase of IBM’s barely profitable PC 
business (IBMPCD). This is the innovation of the paper. The analysis come 
to the following conclusions: (1) Optimizing the share structure and 
establishing a share structure which has some centralization, 
comparatively control stockholders and other large stockholders. (2) 
Establishing a long-term incentive mechanism which is mainly for the top 
management. (3) The top management compensation incentive mechanism 
should be performance-based. (4) The compensation difference between top 
management and common employees should be moderation. At the finally of 
the paper, the conclusions are used in the listed company of our country 
and thus gained the inspirations. 
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     本文所指公司治理是指狭义的公司治理。 
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& Hart, 1986)以及哈特和莫尔（Hart 和 Moore, 1990）在威廉姆森（1975, 1979）
和克莱茵(1978)对纵向一体化问题研究的基础上，发展了一个 优所有权结构。 
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